What’s Up In Spanje?: The Floods In Valencia

Normaal geven we in onze nieuwsbrief de lokale/provinciale politiek in Brabant en Zeeland de spotlight. Maar dit keer is het Zeeland en Spanje. Sal van den Berg & Bart Leloux hebben namelijk een stuk geschreven over tourisme in Zeeland, en ons bestuurslid Aitana heeft een geweldig stuk geschreven over de overstromingen in Valencia, waar zij vandaan komt.

Dit is het artikel van Aitana, Sal & Barts artikel staat ook op onze site, check die hier!

The Floods In Valencia

by Aitana Pallas

A DANA[1] (Isolated Depression at High Levels) is a common phenomenon in the Mediterranean towards the end of the summer and beginning of autumn[2]. This happens when cold polar air is isolated and starts circulating at very high altitudes, which then creates heavy rains when it meets the warmer air in the Mediterranean Sea. In general, these DANAs do not cause the level of harm and destruction we saw in October 2024. According to the AEMET (Spanish Meteorological Agency), this was the most adverse storm of the century in the Valencian Community. This resulted in some zones in Valencia receiving the equivalent of a year in rain in 8 hours[3], with some places receiving almost 500mm of rainfall per square meter. In the span of 48 hours, over 220 people died[4], and its effects can still be seen today.

Here is a summarized timeline[5]:

23 October- AEMET warns of the arrival of the DANA, talks of the uncertainty of its effects. Two days later an AEMET meteorologist warns of a potential “high impact” of the DANA.

• 28 October- AEMET issues an orange alert for rain in several points of Valencia.
• 29 October (7:30)- AEMET issues a red alert. This is extended to all of Valencia within a few hours
• 29 October (11:55)- The Júcar Hydrographic Confederation (CHJ)[6] warns of overflowing ravines in the south of Valencia
• 29 October (13:00)- Carlos Mazán, the President of the regional government, gives a press conference saying that he expects the storm to dissipate by 18:00.
• 29 October (14:00)- the Emergency Coordination Centre of the Valencian Community activates an emergency status in 2 districts. The recommendation is to be ready to leave their homes and to only use vehicles if absolutely necessary.
• 29 October (15:20)- some areas in the center of Valencia are completely flooded. The intervention of the Military Emergency Unit (UME)[7] is requested.
• 29 October (17:00)- the Comprehensive Operational Coordination Center (CECOPI) emergency response protocol starts
• 29 October (20:14)- the first mobile phone alert is issued. At this point the entirety of Valencia is in a state of emergency, with areas already almost or completely flooded, and people trapped in cars, factories and malls. A second mobile alert is issued an hour later for specific districts.
• 29 October (21:41)- Mazón confirms that bodies have already been found and that the death count would likely increase as some areas were completely inaccessible.
• 30 October (6:00)- the preliminary number of deaths and disappearances is known. The news reports that many people were forced to sleep in their cars, roofs or even holding on to trees to avoid being dragged by the current.
• 30 October (7:08)- a third mobile alert is issued, warning people to avoid using the roads.

While the effects of the DANA could not have been completely avoided, this one stands out because of its administrative and preventative failures. For example, Mazón downplaying the storm encouraged people to continue with their normal lives and put them at risk[8]. The emergency procedures that could have prevented many deaths was also not activated until thousands of people were at risk, and when the floods had already devastated parts of Valencia.

The lack of preparedness comes partly from the budget cuts done in 2023. For example, in response to flooding in 2019, the former left wing[9] Valencian government created the Valencian Emergencies Unit (UVE). The UVE meant to improve the coordination between different emergency bodies (such as firefighters) during climate related crises. This began as a controversial project in 2020 that started its implementation and staffing process in February 2023[10]. After the elections in 2023, the current right wing[11] Valencian government removed the UVE because it was considered a “superfluous expense” despite the fact that it represented 0.03% of the budget[12]. This is not the first time there is a lack of investment in necessary projects because of political will. The CHJ has been giving warnings about the need for preventative projects for 15 years, and about the possibility of one of the ravines overflowing in October (usually the ravine is dry but overflowed with the heavy rainfall)[13].

Another issue was the general irresponsibility of Carlos Mazón and the regional government. Despite the warnings from the AEMET and information given by organizations such as the CHJ, the Valencian government failed to activate the mass mobile ES-Alert on time. Issuing these kinds of warnings, according to the Ministry of Interior, is the responsibility of regional governments[14]. This is especially the case because the Valencian government declared a level 2 emergency[15]; at this level the management of the emergency is the responsibility of the regional government. The Valencian government can request help from the national government (such as the UME); however, the latter can only intervene and take over if a level 3 emergency is declared. Mazón has been further criticized for attending a three-hour lunch with a journalist on the 29th of October, meaning he did not arrive at the emergency coordination center meeting until 19:00. Despite recognizing mistakes made during the crisis, Mazón continues to refuse to resign[16].

Why is this relevant for The Netherlands? One of the reasons why this is concerning is that it is a sign of the effects of climate change; increased temperatures of the Mediterranean Sea make it easier for DANAs to happen and to be more severe. According to scientists of the World Weather Attribution, climate change has made intense rainfall “about 12% heavier and twice as likely”[17]. This is not limited to Spain; UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres says 2024 has been a “masterclass in climate destruction”[18]. As climate disasters like these become more common, it is more and more important to ensure governments have the tools to prevent and respond to them. However, cases  where projects are not politically beneficial come at a high cost of human lives and infrastructure. Being prepared is not limited to immediate responses, but “demands a shift in mindset, building enduring resilience into public safety frameworks that transcend political divides”[19].

The effects of the DANA are ongoing, if you are interested here is a website with a list of organizations involved, their work, and ways to donate: https://www.rtve.es/noticias/ayuda-victimas-de-la-dana/

Sources

[1] This article will use the Spanish acronyms of terms with a translation of what it means

[2] https://wmo.int/media/news/devastating-rainfall-hits-spain-yet-another-flood-related-disaster

[3] https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20241030/catastrofico-temporal-valencia-lluvia-dana/16310046.shtml

[4] https://maldita.es/malditateexplica/20241030/dana-comunidad-valenciana-castilla-la-mancha/#:~:text=%C2%BFA%20qu%C3%A9%20hora%20se%20lanzaron%20las%20alertas%20de%20Protecci%C3%B3n%20Civil%20y%20qui%C3%A9n%20es%20el%20responsable%20de%20lanzarlas%3F

[5] https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20241031/cronologia-dana-12-horas-alerta-movil/16311521.shtml, and https://www.newtral.es/avisos-dana/20241031/

[6] This is an organization under the Ministry of Ecological Transition and Demographic Challenge.

[7] This is a unit specialized in rescue missions in extreme situations. It must be requested by a regional government and approved by the national government (https://elgeneracionalpost.com/politica/2024/1104/176151/responsabilidades-politicas.html)

[8] https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cx24815x66eo

[9] PSOE/Compromís/Podem coalition government, PSOE is more or less like the PvdA

[10] https://maldita.es/malditateexplica/20240223/unidad-valenciana-emergencias-uve-carlos-mazon/

[11] PP/Vox, more or less like VVD/PVV. This was the government at the time; during the summer of 2024, Vox decided to leave the PP/Vox regional coalitions (including Valencia) over disagreements of regional governments’ responsibility to receive unaccompanied minor migrants (https://www.newtral.es/vox-rompe-gobierno-pp/20240711/)

[12] https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/opinion/the-brief-valencia-floods-are-europes-wake-up-call-for-preparedness/

[13] https://valenciaplaza.com/la-chj-tiene-obras-previstas-contra-las-riadas-en-la-zona-inundada-desde-hace-15-anos

[14] https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20241031/interior-recuerda-mazon-alertas-planes-proteccion-dana-responsabilidad-gobierno-valenciano/16310950.shtml

[15] Spain has a decentralized model, with regional and national responsibilities. In the case of emergencies, the level of involvement of the national government depends on how severe it is- at a level 3 the national government takes complete control over the emergency coordination. Level 3 can be declared by the regional government itself or by the Minister of Interior, with “the maximum possible consensus with the autonomous community”. The national government argued against declaring a level 3 emergency, because it has never been declared before and because the Valencian government was unwilling to increase the level of emergency (https://www.newtral.es/declarar-emergencia-nacional/20241114/)

[16] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/15/valencias-president-carlos-mazon-admits-mistakes-in-flood-response-but-will-not-resign

[17] https://www.euronews.com/green/2024/11/14/climate-change-kills-spain-faces-new-flood-threat-as-leaders-highlight-extreme-weather-at-

[18] https://www.euronews.com/green/2024/11/14/climate-change-kills-spain-faces-new-flood-threat-as-leaders-highlight-extreme-weather-at-

[19] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-8739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf